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A. Introduction 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) enacted by the Westminster 
Parliament applies to public authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and 
to UK public authorities that operate in Scotland e.g. the BBC, whilst the Freedom of 
Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA), promulgated by the Scottish Parliament, 
applies to Scottish public authorities.1  Both Acts commenced on 1st January 2005, 
and have been hailed as success stories – helping the public and the press to obtain 
information on issues such as: problems with a nuclear reactor,2 inadequate health 
services, 3  school closures, 4  a lack of suitable quality housing for people with 
disabilities5 and so forth.6  Nevertheless, FOIA has been described as ‘a brilliant piece 
of trompe l’oeil, a sheep in wolf’s clothing,’7 appearing to offer a legally enforceable right 
of access to governmental information subject only to specified and justifiable 
exemptions when, in fact, it offers weak information access rights. By contrast, it has 
been asserted that ‘Scotland has most robust Freedom of Information regime in the 
UK.’8 A two-strand approach is used to test the veracity of these claims and determine 
whether both jurisdictions have freedom of information laws that are fit for purpose as 
the Acts enter their second decade. Firstly, an assessment of the degree of compliance 
of both Acts with principles that have been endorsed by the United Nations as 
forming the normative foundations of freedom of information laws is undertaken. 
Secondly, the Acts are compared to ascertain whether FOISA does in fact offer 
stronger information access rights than FOIA, and if so, what lessons the UK could 
draw upon to strengthen FOIA. The analysis will demonstrate that the Acts are 
creatures of their respective Parliaments and that distinct ‘political cultures’ have 
influenced their evolution over the past ten years leading to significant divergences 
between the two. It concludes that, at present, FOISA offers stronger information 
access rights whereas FOIA offers weaker rights, but both Acts should be amended to 																																																								
* Lecturer in Law, University of East Anglia. I am grateful to Prof Morten Hviid, Prof Mark James, Dr 
1 As a result of the Brexit referendum, the UK may cease to be a member of the European Union. 
Whilst this may impact upon information requests made under the Environmental Information 
Regulations 2004, it will not affect requests for information made under FOIA or FOISA since these 
are domestic Acts of Parliament.  
2 ‘The end of FoI?  9 things we only know because of the Freedom of Information Act,’ The 
Independent (17 July 2015). 
3 ‘Kids as young as 9 sent away for treatment,’ The Derry Journal, (16 October 2015). 
4 National Association of Small Schools, ‘Scottish Rural Schools Network,’ (Newsletter, March 2014).  
5 Inclusion Scotland, Homes for Life? – FOI research into accessible homes for disabled people in 
Scotland, (2008). 
6 Numerous other examples of FOI requests by the press were provided in the submission to the 
Independent Commission on Freedom of Information; Johnston Press (2015) ‘A response to the 
Call for Evidence by the Independent Commission on Freedom of Information,’ available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/483322/Johnston_Press_
Submission.pdf. 
7 R Austin, ‘Freedom of Information Act 2000 - a sheep in wolf’s clothing?’ in J Jowell, & D Oliver 
(eds), The Changing Constitution, 6th edn (2007) 397. 
8 The Scottish Government, ‘More bodies eligible for FOI requests,’ (31 March 2014), available at: 
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/More-bodies-eligible-for-FOI-requests-aec.aspx 
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ensure full compliance with the UN endorsed principles if both jurisdictions are to 
have information rights that are fit for purpose as the Acts enter their second decade.  
 
 
B. Comparative evaluation - normative principles  
The highly respected NGO, ARTICLE 19, synthesized nine normative principles 
from international and regional laws (e.g. UNDHR and ECHR) and judicial 
pronouncements in 1999 and updated them in 2015.9 These United Nations endorsed 
principles collectively constitute best practice standards in respect of right to 
information legislation. 10  This article analyses compliance with six of the nine 
principles only, namely: Maximum disclosure, Obligation to publish, Promotion of 
open government, Limited scope of exceptions, Processes to facilitate access and 
Costs. The Acts are not compared against the open meetings, disclosure takes 
precedence, or protection for whistleblowers principles since other laws, which are not 
the focus of this paper, govern these.11The evaluation is timely as the first UNESCO 
commissioned comparative survey of freedom of information laws compliance with 
these principles was conducted in 200312 prior to the implementation of FOIA and 
FOISA and the second in 2008 shortly after their implementation when insufficient 
data such as Tribunal decisions, court cases and information commissioner reports 
existed to properly assess their compliance, 13 whereas this article provides the first 
comparative assessment of compliance with the updated principles. Compliance is 
evaluated by reference to ministerial speeches, white papers, parliamentary debates, 
post-legislative reviews, public opinion surveys and statistics on performance, 
Commissioner decisions and cases heard by Tribunals and Courts in both 
jurisdictions.  
 
(1) Maximum Disclosure Principle 
The ‘maximum disclosure’ principle seeks to establish a culture of information rights 
in countries where none has previously existed through recommending the granting of 
legally enforceable rights not limited by residence or purpose, recommending that the 
legislation contain broad definitions of information and public authorities, and 
further, the inclusion of criminal and financial sanctions for actions intended to 
prevent disclosure, to promote compliance with the law. Both Acts comply with this 
principle in granting access rights to ‘all persons and informal and formal 
organisations, regardless of citizenship or residence,’14 and in defining information as 
‘information recorded in any form,’ 15 regardless of its form, status, date received and 
whether or not it was produced by the public authority which holds it at the time the 																																																								
9 ARTICLE 19, (1999), The Public’s Right To Know: Principles on Freedom of Information 
Legislation, available at: http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/righttoknow.pdf; The 
principles were updated in 2015. This article evaluates both acts against the revised principles where 
these differ from the original principles (currently only available in dual language format), available at: 
https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38117/en/asia:-the-right-to-know-principles 
10 UN HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on access to information, criminal libel and defamation, 
the police and the criminal justice system, and new technologies, UN Doc.E/CN.4/2000/63; It was 
referred to by the Commission in its 2000 resolution on freedom of expression; UN CHR, 2000/38: 
Resolution, Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc.E/CN.4/RES/2000/63. 
11 P Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal, 4th edn  (2010) 116 
12 T Mendel, Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey, UNESCO (2003). 
13 T Mendel, Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey: Second edition revised and 
updated, UNESCO (2008). 
14 FOIA, s 1(1); FOISA, s 1(1). 
15 s 84 subject to section 51(8) and section 75(2); s 73 FOISA. 
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request is received.  
 
(a) Public authorities  
Both Acts appear, at first glance, to comply with this principle’s recommendation to 
interpret the term ‘public authority’ broadly since Schedule 1 of both Acts list a large 
number of public authorities by name that includes all central government 
departments and legislative bodies and the armed forces.16 Schedule 1 of FOIA lists 
more bodies than its Scottish equivalent, partly a reflection of Scotland having fewer 
public authorities since the BBC17 and other bodies such as the Forestry Commission 
and Scottish Consumer Council were, prior to devolution and continue to be, 
considered UK-wide public authorities under FOIA. Also, information supplied by a 
UK Minister or UK Government Department and held in confidence by a Scottish 
authority is not ‘held’ by a Scottish authority for the purposes of FOISA, rather the 
request should be made to the relevant Minister or Department of the UK 
Government under FOIA – a reflection of the ultimate sovereignty of the Westminster 
Parliament.18 
A second aspect of this principle anticipates and provides for changes in 
government service delivery, in recommending designation as ‘public’ those ‘private’ 
bodies which ‘carry out public functions (such as maintaining roads or operating rail 
lines) or hold decision-making authority or expend public money’ thereby ensuring 
continuing information rights as public service provision is outsourced to private 
contractors. Extending FOI obligations to private providers of public services is a 
crucial test of how committed a government is to being truly open and transparent 
since bodies not classified as ‘public authorities’ are beyond the scope of the Acts and 
not legally obliged to respond to information requests.  The inclusion of designation 
powers19 in both Acts suggests compliance with this principle. However, the Scottish 
Government was slow to add to the list of designated bodies, not doing so for the first 
nine years of the Act. On a positive note, FOISA was amended in 2013 to include a 
new section, s 7A, which provides that Ministers are obliged to report to Parliament 
on their use of the designation power every two years and give reasons for not using 
the power if it hasn’t done so in the two-year reporting period.20 It has been used 
regularly since then, to extend FOISA to cover recreational, sporting, cultural or 
social bodies established and financed, wholly or in part, by local authorities,21 
contractors who run privately-managed prisons, providers of secure accommodation 
for children, grant-aided schools and independent special schools, and an organisation 
that exists to facilitate the commercialisation of intellectual property arising from the 
staff of NHS Scotland (Scottish Health Innovations Ltd).22 These designations are 
evidence of a FOISA-friendly political culture as the Scottish Government cited parity 																																																								
16 A public authority is a body listed in Schedule 1 or one designed by order under Section 5, or a 
publically owned company by virtue of section 6 FOIA / FOISA. Section 5 or section 6 bodies don’t 
appear in Schedule 1. 
17 s7 FOIA; The BBC is a public authority in respect of information ‘held for purposes other than that 
of journalism, art or literature only.’  
18 S3(2)(a)(ii) FOISA.	
19 Section 5 of both Acts delegates legislative authority to the Secretary of State/Scottish Ministers. 
20 SIC, (2013) Freedom of Information (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2013: Briefing Note, available at: 
http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?lID=6932&sID=377 
21 The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (Designation of Persons as Scottish Public 
Authorities) Order 2013, S.I. 2013/278. 
22 The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (Designation of Persons as Scottish Public 
Authorities) Order 2016, S.I. 2016/139 
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of legal responsibilities and equity in terms of accessing information irrespective of 
sources of funding when designating these bodies and asserted that the benefits 
outweighed the compliance burden that would be imposed on private contractors.23  
The Westminster Government was also slow to designate - it took five years 
from implementation for the power to designate bodies to be utilised 24  and a 
subsequent proposed amendment to FOIA25 to automatically bring all information 
held by a contractor (including that held by a sub-contractor) about the performance 
of a contract within the Acts did not receive support from the Coalition Government. 
Instead, they favoured introducing a revised code of good practice under section 45 of 
the Act.26 The NGO, Campaign for Freedom Of Information (CFOI) is critical of the 
code because it is voluntary and lacks sanctions: ‘Should an authority choose to ignore 
the new code, all the Commissioner can do is issue a non-binding “practice 
recommendation.” If a contractor refuses to disclose voluntarily, even this option 
won’t be available.’27 The ICO recommended that the Act be extended to private 
bodies providing public services under contract by treating information about the 
performance of the contract as being ‘held’ on behalf of the contracting public 
authority where the contract is over £5 million in value or continuing over 5 years or 
where the contractor solely derives its revenue from public sector contracts. 28 This 
would, if introduced, ensure that FOIA obligations extend to outsourced contracts, 
thereby preserving information rights that existed when such contracts were 
performed by public authorities. The Conservative Government led by Mr Cameron 
favoured a ‘small state’ model of government in which many services traditionally 
provided by the public sector were outsourced to private providers, so it’s silence29 in 
response to the ICO’s recommendation on this issue was telling, as allowing such 
bodies to comply with transparency measures on a voluntary basis, with no effective 
sanctions for non-compliance suggested that it was not truly committed to FOIA. It 
remains to be seen whether the Conservative Government led by Theresa May will 
adopt a different approach.  
 
 
(b) Penalties 
FOIA and FOISA both comply with the maximum disclosure principle requirement 
to contain provisions imposing criminal sanctions and financial penalties on any 
																																																								
23 Scottish Government, Consultation on Further Extension of Coverage of the Freedom of Information 
(Scotland) Act 2002 to More Organisations: Scottish Government Response (January 2016) 
PPDAS62889 (01/16) 4  
24 In 2010, The Academies Act 2010 extended FOIA to academy schools. In 2011, the UK designated 
the Association of Chief Police Officers, UCAS and the Financial Ombudsman Service; It did so 
through The Freedom of Information (Designation as Public Authorities) Order 2011.  
25 Transparency and Accountability Bill 2014-2015, Bill 28 55/4, available at: 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/transparencyandaccountability.html 
26 Hansard, HL Deb, 20 October 2014, col. 450  
27 CFOI, MP’s debate amendment to bring contractors’ information under FOI Act,’ (23rd October 
2015), available at: https://www.cfoi.org.uk/2014/10/mps-debate-amendment-to-bring-contractors-
information-under-foi-act/ 
28 ICO, ‘Freedom of Information, Transparency in Outsourcing: a roadmap,’ available at 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1043531/transparency-in-outsourcing-
roadmap.pdf 
29 Cabinet Office, The Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, Written Statement to Parliament: Open and 
Transparent Government (1 March 2016), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/open-
and-transparent-government 
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public authority that ‘obstructs access to or wilfully destroys information,’30  but 
differences in the time frames for commencing prosecutions impact on the 
effectiveness of each Act. In 2013, FOISA was amended31 to extend the time frame 
for commencing prosecutions from 6 months to three years of the offence being 
committed.32 By contrast, the time frame for commencing prosecutions under FOIA 
remains ‘within 6 months of the offence being committed’33 - this short time frame has 
precluded prosecutions by the UK Information Commissioner (ICO) as the time 
taken by public authorities to investigate time bars prosecutions.  In an effort to 
improve the effectiveness of FOIA the Independent Commission recommended that 
the Westminster government legislate to make the offence at section 77 of the Act 
triable either way which would have the effect of removing the time limit for those 
seeking to bring a prosecution, and would also allow for a custodial sentence for 
particularly serious acts of destruction,34 but the then Government’s response to the 
Independent Commission’s report35 did not indicate an intention to give effect to this 
recommendation, suggesting a lack of political support for effective FOIA sanctions.  
In summary, the amendment of FOISA to include a biannual review of the 
use of designation powers ensures compliance with the ARTICLE 19 
recommendation to widely define ‘public authorities,’ whereas, the introduction of a 
code of practice for private contractors represents a both a weakening of rights under 
FOIA in comparison to rights under FOISA and incomplete compliance with this 
principle. Also, the longer prosecution commencement time-frame under FOISA 
means that it is fully compliant with the ARTICLE 19 principle, whereas the 
impractically short time period under FOIA means that it is not compliant with this 
principle and will remain so until a Westminster Government gives legislative effect to 
the Independent Commission’s recommendation that s 77 offences become triable 
either way. Arguably the Westminster Government’s silence on both 
recommendations reflects the prevailing political culture, that is, the Westminster 
Government is not truly supportive of FOIA, an argument fully explored below in 
section C.  
 
(2) Obligation to publish principle 
The ‘obligation to publish’ principle recommends that public authorities proactively 
publish key information as well as responding to information requests, to promote a 
culture of openness and transparency that should improve over time.36 In compliance 																																																								
30 s 77 FOIA; s1(b) and s65 FOISA. The maximum fine under FOISA is £5000, but unlimited under s 
77 FOIA since section 85 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act came into 
force on 12 March 2015.  
31 Freedom of Information (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2013 
32 s 65A FOISA stipulates that prosecutions must be commenced within 6 months of discovery of the 
commission of an offence provided that the offence was committed no more than 3 years ago. 
33 s127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 stipulates that any prosecution of for a summary offence 
must commence within 6 months of the offence being committed, unless legislation specifies 
otherwise. 
34 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report, (1 March 2016) 16, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504139/Independent_Fr
eedom_of_Information_Commission_Report.pdf  
35  Cabinet Office (n 28) 
36 This ARTICLE 19 ‘obligation to publish’ principle was updated in 2015 to include a 
recommendation that information proactively published or released in response to requests should be 
‘made available in open and machine readable formats when applicable, and without restrictions on its 
further use and publication,’ but compliance with this aspect of the principle is not the focus of this 
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with this principle, both Acts require public authorities to develop, publish and 
implement a publication scheme, setting out the classes of information they will 
publish, the manner in which they will publish them and whether or not they intend 
to charge for any particular publication.37 To assist, the Information Commissioners 
in both jurisdictions have produced ‘model’ publication schemes.38  UK public bodies 
are legally required to comply with the model publication scheme whereas Scottish 
public bodies are encouraged but not compelled to adopt the model scheme – they 
may develop their own ‘bespoke’ publication scheme. During the passage of the 
FOIA, legislators expressed an expectation that the Information Commissioner (ICO) 
would perform a supervisory role in relation to the adequacy and suitability of each 
public authority’s publication scheme. To this end, the ICO can serve an enforcement 
notice obligating a public body to introduce a publication scheme in compliance with 
the model scheme where it has not done so.39  In Scotland, the SIC can additionally 
withhold (for proposed schemes) or withdraw approval in respect of bespoke 
publication schemes. When FOIA was first enacted the model publication scheme was 
criticized as placing a vague, unenforceable general duty on public bodies to: 
  
decide for themselves what to publish in publication schemes. Although the 
information commissioner may appear to have enforcement powers by virtue 
of the approval provisions, the withholding of approval does not have any 
sanction.40 
 
However, these concerns proved to be misplaced since the ICO expressed satisfaction 
that public authorities did seek to include appropriate information in their publication 
schemes and was largely positive regarding the enforcement powers he had in respect 
of the publication schemes in a post-legislative scrutiny of FOIA ten years after its 
enactment.41 Instead, criticism was levelled at the publication scheme for being ‘fairly 
antiquated,’42 that is, outmoded due to advances in search engine capabilities in that 
‘It is probably easier to put a request into a search engine than it is to go through 
formal documents.’43  Indeed, publication schemes reflect the technology available at 
the time of legislative enactment – the UK Government only started releasing 
information through an online search engine in 2004.44 The current ease and low cost 																																																																																																																																																														
paper, since it dealt with in a separate legislative measure: The Re-use of Public Sector Information 
Regulations 2015, S.I 2015/1415, established a UK-wide (including Scotland) framework for the re-use 
of public sector information, enforcement of which is overseen by the ICO.  	
37 S 19 of FOIA; s23 FOISA 
38 ICO, Model Publication Scheme, available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1153/model-publication-scheme.pdf; SIC, The Model Publication Scheme, 
available at: 
http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/ScottishPublicAuthorities/PublicationSchemes/TheModelPublicati
onScheme.aspx 
39 FOIA s 52(1); FOISA s 51(1) and s 52 
40 Austin (n6) 
41  House of Commons, Justice Committee, Post Legislative Scrutiny of the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000, First Report of Session 2012-13, Volume I, HC 96-I, Evidence by the Information 
Commissioner, 12 
42 Ibid Evidence by Roger Gough, Cabinet Member for Business Strategy and Support at Kent County 
Council, 12  
43 Ibid Evidence by Professor Trevor McMillan, Pro-Vice Chancellor for Research, Lancaster 
University and Chair of the 1994 Group Research and Enterprise Policy Group, 12 
44 M Cross, ‘Direct to your destination,’ The Guardian, (4 March 2004) available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2004/mar/04/internet.egovernment 
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of making information available online means that in the longer term, both Acts 
should be amended to obligate public authorities to publish disclosure logs, a practice 
that some (but not all) authorities currently engage in: ‘they publish lists of all previous 
requests, and you can click on them and find out what the request was and what 
information was disclosed; it is, as it were, a back record of things that people have 
asked us.’45 Public authorities that already do so report that it helps them manage 
requests by directing requestors to information that has already been published on 
their website. 46   The Independent Commission acknowledged the efficacy of 
disclosure logs and recommended that the Westminster government legislate to 
impose a requirement on all public authorities who are subject to the [FOIA] and 
employ 100 or more full time equivalent employees to publish as soon as the 
information is provided (where practicable), all requests and responses where 
information is provided in whole or in part to a requestor. 47  However, the 
Government of the day did not indicate any intention to implement this 
recommendation in its response to the Independent Commission’s report. 48 
Thus, both Acts comply to a high degree with this principle, but both Acts 
should be amended to require publication schemes to be supplemented with 
disclosure logs to increase transparency and accountability of public authorities, 
particularly as low Internet publishing costs means that public authorities can now 
easily produce disclosure logs. Since many public authorities will only do so if legally 
obligated to, a future measure of political support for FOI rights in both jurisdictions 
will be the introduction or absence of disclosure logs.  
 
 
(3) Promotion of Open Government principle 
The principle of open government aims to promote a change of culture within 
government and public bodies so that, over time, they become more transparent. It 
has two aspects: public education, and, tackling any culture of government secrecy.   
 
(a) Public education 
Both Acts contain a range of promotional measures in compliance with the first aspect 
of this this principle, for instance, both Commissioners provide educational resources 
on their websites to inform the public of the existence of access rights and how to 
exercise those rights. Likewise, the Commissioners in both jurisdictions sponsor 
regular surveys to track awareness of the legislation. In the most recent UK survey of 
the general public, 82% confirmed when prompted, awareness of the Freedom of 
																																																								
45 House of Commons, Justice Committee (n 18) Evidence by Professor Hazell, 14  
46 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information: call for evidence responses, Call for evidence 
responses from	Organisations: D to L, 149; London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames have 
introduced a disclosure log and early indications suggest that it has resulted in a small decrease in FOI 
requests received, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491616/Responses_D_-
_L.pdf 
47 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report (n 32) 17 
48 Cabinet Office (n 28) 
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Information Act.49 Similarly, 73% of Scottish respondents ‘had definitely heard of the 
FOI Act.’ 50  
 
(b) Tackling culture of government secrecy 
Also, in an attempt to address any culture of government secrecy, both Acts require 
their respective Information Commissioner to promote public authority compliance 
with codes of practice on good practice in dealing with requests for information51 and 
on good practice in keeping, managing, and destroying records.52 The Commissioners 
are under a duty to promote observance of the non-statutory53 codes despite the 
absence of a legal duty on public authorities to follow or even to have regard to 
them.54  The Commissioners can issue a written ‘practice recommendation’ specifying 
the steps which in their opinion ought to be taken to promote conformity with the 
codes if a public body is not in compliance.55 The ICO has primarily used this power 
to address consistently poor practice regarding slow internal reviews and poor records 
management.56  However, the Acts do not specify the consequences of a failure to 
comply with a practice recommendation. During the passage of FOIA, legislators 
acknowledged this, but were satisfied that ‘The power of naming and shaming should 
not be underestimated in regard to public sector bodies keen to keep the confidence of 
the public they serve.’57 It seems that this was an overly optimistic prediction, as 
although these measures have resulted in improvements in response times by the 
public authorities being monitored by the ICO they do not appear to have led to a 
general improvement in response times across all sectors; indeed, some public 
authorities have ‘slipped back’ once the formal monitoring has ended.58 
																																																								
49 ComRes, Annual Track 2014 Individuals (Topline findings) ICO, available at: 
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1043485/annual-track-september-2014-
individuals.pdf 
50 SIC, IPSOS MORI Public Awareness Survey Results 2014, available at: 
http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/home/SICReports/OtherReports/PublicAwarenessResearch2014.as
px 
51 s16 FOIA; s15 FOISA 
52 s 45 FOIA; s 60 FOISA In Scotland the duty is cast upon the Scottish Ministers. These provisions set 
out what must be included in the code, and allow for different provision to be made for different public 
authorities. The former also provides that before issuing or revising any code under this section, the 
secretary of justice must consult the information commissioner and then must subsequently lay any 
code or revised code before each house of parliament.  
53 S 45 Code of Practice, para 3; Scottish Code of Practice on the Discharge of Functions by Public 
Authorities under the FOISA, Introduction, issued pursuant to FOISA s 60. 
54 S 47(1) FOIA; s 43(1) FOISA. The s 45 Code of Practice, para 3 provides that authorities are 
expected to abide by the Code unless there are good reasons, capable of being justified to the 
information commissioner, why it would be inappropriate to do so.  
55 S 48(1) FOIA; s 44(1) FOISA The Information Commissioner is required to consult the keeper of the 
Public Records (or Deputy Keeper in NI) before giving a practice recommendation relating to the Lord 
Chancellor’s code of practice on record-keeping, s 48(3) and 48(4) FOIA 
56 J Goodall, & O Gay, (2010) Freedom of information: the first five years, Standard Note 
SN/PC/05666, available at: http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05666.pdf 
57 Section 45 Code of Practice on the discharge of the Functions of Public Authorities under Part 1 of 
the Freedom of Information Act, 2000 Foreword, para 7, which states: ‘practice recommendation is 
simply a recommendation and cannot be directly enforced by the information commissioner. However, 
a failure to comply with a practice recommendation may lead to a failure to comply with the Act. 
Further, a failure to take account of a practice recommendation may lead to an adverse comment in a 
report to Parliament by the Commissioner.’  
58 M Rosenbaum, ‘Cabinet Office delays over freedom of information,’ BBC News, (4 August 2015), 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33696753 
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By contrast, the Scottish Information Commissioner (SIC) has developed a 
particularly effective practice for monitoring public authority performance with 
FOISA obligations. Since April 2013, Scottish public authorities have provided the 
SIC with data about the information requests received, on a quarterly basis via an 
online statistics portal.59 The SIC has confirmed that although public authorities are 
not legally obliged to submit statistics, the voluntary reporting practice has proved a 
success, achieving 100% response rate by authorities.60 The SIC uses this information 
to monitor performance and intervene61 where an authority’s practice is or may be in 
breach of its statutory duties or failing to comply with the s 60 code of practice.62   
In oral evidence to the Independent Commission the ICO expressed enthusiasm for 
the introduction of a similar scheme in respect of FOIA but pointed out that it would 
need to be properly resourced. 63 Indeed, this ARTICLE 19 principle recommends 
that ‘the law should require that adequate resources and attention are devoted to the 
question of promoting the goals of the legislation.’ However, the ICO has experienced 
a budget cuts (in excess of 30% since 2011)64 whilst the SIC has suffered less severe yet 
significant budget cuts (15% since 2011)65 impacting upon their ability to dedicate 
resources to promotional and educational activities.  The Independent Commission 
accepted the need for the ICO to have both greater monitoring powers and adequate 
resources, recommending that the Westminster government legislate to impose a 
requirement on all public authorities who are subject to the Act and employ 100 or 
more full time equivalent employees to submit for publication, by either the ICO or a 
department of the government’s choosing, statistics on their compliance under the 
Act,66 and further recommending that the government review whether the funding 
provided to the ICO is adequate. 67 However, the Government’s response indicated 
an intention to partially accept the Independent Commission’s recommendation in 
agreeing to issue guidance in the revised section 45 code of practice to set a standard 
that public authorities with 100 full time equivalent employees or more should publish 
																																																								
59 SIC Statistics portal, available at: https://stats.itspublicknowledge.info 
60 The SIC confirmed 100% compliance with this voluntary reporting practice in response to an 
information request made by the author, SIC letter Ref: 201600134, (2nd February 2016)   
61 SIC, (2015) Briefings and Guidance, Intervention Procedures, available at: 
http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/Law/FOISA-EIRsGuidance/Briefings.aspx 
62 SIC, (2014) Scottish Ministers' Code of Practice On The Discharge Of Functions By Scottish Public 
Authorities Under The Freedom Of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 And The Environmental 
Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004, SG/2014/245   
63 C Graham, Independent Commission on Freedom of Information Oral evidence session: 25 January 
2015, uncorrected transcript, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494934/ICFOI-oral-
evidence-transcript-25-January16.pdf 
64 House of Commons, Justice Committee - Ninth Report, ‘The functions, powers and resources of the 
Information Commissioner,’ Written evidence from the Information Commissioner, (HC 962), para. 4, 
available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmjust/962/962we02.htm; 
In the financial year 2008-09 the ICO received £5.6 grant in aid, this was reduced to £3.7m in the 
financial year 2014-15.  
65 SIC, (2014) ‘2013/14 Annual Report Taking FOI forward.’ 28, available at: 
http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?lID=7920&sID=234; The SIC 
confirmed that the budget reduction referred to in the 2013/14 annual report was 15% (in real-terms) in 
total over the financial years 2011/12, 2012/13 and 2013/14 in response to an information request made 
by the author, SIC letter Ref: 201501311, (23rd July 2015) 
66 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report, (n 32) 17 	
67 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report (n 32) 50 
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such information, but it did not indicate an intention to review whether the funding 
provided to the ICO is adequate.68  
Overall, both FOIA and FOISA are partially compliant with this principle. To 
strengthen observance of statutory obligations under FOIA and the s45 non-statutory 
code of practice,69 the Westminster Government indicated an intention to implement 
the Independent Commission’s recommendation to require public authorities with 
100 or more employees to submit performance statistics on a quarterly basis, but it did 
not give effect to this intention. By contrast, FOISA permits small authorities that 
share administrative functions with another authority (e.g. some licensing boards and 
non-Ministerial Officeholders) to submit collated statistics. Arguably this approach is 
better than the de minimis approach under FOIA since it allows the SIC to gain some 
evidence on the degree of compliance with FOISA by small public authorities without 
imposing excessively burdensome quarterly reporting obligations, whereas such 
evidence is less readily available to the ICO.  The common weakness in both Acts is 
the lack of resources available to both Information Commissioners for education and 
monitoring performance compliance. An acid test of Westminster governmental 
support for FOI rights in the coming decade will be the provision of adequate 
resources to support the ICO in the face of austerity cuts.70 
 
(4) Limited Scope of Exceptions principle 
An inevitable tension exists between the principle of the right to know and any claim a 
government makes to restrict disclosure. Extensive exemptions would undermine the 
efficacy of the right to access information by inhibiting transparency.  Accordingly, 
this ARTICLE 19 principle states that no public authorities should be completely 
excluded from the ambit of the law, that information requested should be supplied 
unless it falls within the scope of limited exceptions and that refusal to disclose 
information should not justified unless it satisfies a strict three-part test: (i) the 
information relates to a legitimate aim listed in the law; (ii) disclosure would cause 
substantial harm to that aim; and (ii) the harm to the aim would be greater than the 
public interest in disclosing the information. This principle also states that information 
that is withheld should be routinely reviewed to ensure that the exemption still applies, 
and that exceptions should be limited to no more than 15 years, except in 
extraordinary circumstances. It is beyond the scope of this article to investigate every 
exemption listed in both Acts. Instead, it provides a broad comparative overview of 
the exemptions in both Acts before focusing on the aspects that have proved most 
controversial, namely, the ‘royal family communications,’ ‘safe space for policy 
discussions’, and relatedly, the ministerial power of veto.  
 
(a) Overview of exemptions  
The exclusion of some intelligence service bodies (M15, M16, GCHQ are excluded, 
whereas, the National Counter Intelligence Office and the Intelligence and Security 																																																								
68 Cabinet Office (n 28) 
69 Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs’ Code of Practice on the discharge of public authorities’ 
functions under Part 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, Issued under section 45 of the Act, 
(2004) HC 33  
70 The same test cannot be used in respect of FOISA since the ICO receives an annual grant-in-aid from 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport to fund the costs of her office in undertaking her statutory 
duties in respect of freedom of information, whereas, the SIC is funded by the Scottish Parliament 
through the corporate body, and its members are elected as individuals to represent the interests of all 
the MSPs and not as party representatives. 	
To	appear	in	Edinburgh	Law	Review	Jan	2017	
	 11	
Committee are included) from FOIA and omission of some but not all defence bodies 
(the Ministry of Defence is subject to FOIA, and requests can be made of the Army, 
Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and Royal Marines but not the Special Air Service or 
the Special Boat Service) from Schedule 1 of FOIA (defence is a reserved matter, so 
could not be included in FOISA) means it is not fully compliant with this principle’s 
recommendation that ‘no public bodies should be completely excluded from the 
ambit of the law, even if the majority of their functions fall within the zone of 
exceptions.’ Additionally, both Acts contain ‘absolute’ exemptions that are not subject 
to any public interest test, and ‘qualified’ exemptions where the duty to disclose does 
not apply if, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the 
exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. In compliance 
with this principle, FOISA contains a ‘substantial harm’ test whereas FOIA adopted a 
weaker, ‘would, or would be likely to, prejudice’ test. In effect, the FOIA test makes it 
easier for public authorities to refuse information requests, an anomaly not lost on 
journalists who tactically submit requests under FOISA in respect of information on 
‘relations between the administrations of the United Kingdom’ 71 since they are more 
likely to succeed than if an identical request were submitted under FOIA. 72  
 
(b) Royal family communications: absolute v qualified exemption 
An absolute exemption, concerning royal correspondence, was added to FOIA in 
response to an information request in respect of correspondence between the heir to 
the throne and government departments which led to R (Evans) v HM Attorney General73 
an epic, decade-long, legal battle,74 that determined disclosure of the correspondence 
was in the public interest. However, as the case proceeded through the courts, 
provisions in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 to amend s37 of 
FOIA were commenced to create an absolute exemption in respect of information 
relating to communications with the ‘Sovereign, the Heir to the Throne and the 
second in line to the Throne, and those acting on their behalf.’ The Scottish 
Government attempted to, but did not succeed, in introducing a similar exemption. It 
consulted upon, before ultimately rejecting, a similar proposed amendment to 
FOISA,75 on the basis that it had received numerous objections to the proposed 
amendment, not least from the then SIC who stated: ‘Absolute exemptions are not 
regarded as good practice, and I consider this measure to be unnecessary,’76 with the 
newly appointed SIC giving oral evidence that under the existing qualified exemption, 
‘there is already adequate provision for the royal family and for discussions that any 
public authority may need to have that are confidential, are covered  by other rights 
or are a matter for national security.’77  																																																								
71 s28 of both FOIA 2000 and FOISA 2002 
72 H Brooke, Your Right to Know (2007) 22 
73 [2015] UKSC 21. 
74 For an overview of the case see K Mc Cullagh, ‘A tangled web of access to information: reflections 
on R (on the application of Evans) and another v Her Majesty's Attorney General,’ (2015) 21 European 
Journal of Current Legal Issues 2, available at: http://webjcli.org/article/view/432 
75 Scottish Parliament, Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill, available at: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_Bills/Freedom%20of%20Information%20(Amendment)%20(Scot
land)%20Bill/b14s4-introd.pdf 
76 Scottish Parliament, 6th Report, 2012 (Session 4): Stage 1 Report on the Freedom of Information 
(Amendment) (Scotland) Bill, SP Paper 201, available at: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_FinanceCommittee/Reports/fir-12-06w.pdf 
77 Scottish Parliament Finance Committee, Official Report, Freedom Of Information (Amendment) 
(Scotland) Bill: Stage 1, 12 September 2012, Col 1515 
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No evidence was adduced that the public interest test in respect of the existing 
qualified exemption had been abused, suggesting that an appropriate balance had 
been struck between FOI and privacy. In response to a suggestion by Deputy First 
Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, that the amendment should be introduced to ensure 
consistency of approach across the UK in respect of both the current and the future 
head of state, the Convenor of the Finance Committee observed that this was not a 
good reason as, 
 
the Queen is also the head of state of Canada, New Zealand and Australia and 
I do not believe that they have consistent relations with the UK on this issue. 
We have a shared monarchy, but we do not necessarily have to have the same 
rules and regulations.78  
 
That such an amendment would generate disparity of access to information in 
comparison to requests made under the Environmental Information Regulations was 
cited as further justification for not introducing an absolute exemption in respect of 
royal correspondence. Such evidence prompted the Finance Committee to pronounce 
that it remained ‘unconvinced of the need for this provision’ and call for it to be 
withdrawn from the Bill, 79 which it duly was at the second stage. The decision by the 
Scottish Government to retain a qualified exemption means that FOISA complies 
with the ‘limited scope of exceptions’ principle to a greater degree than FOIA.  
 
(c) ‘safe space’ exemption 
Whilst it is a truism that increasing transparency and accountability through the 
disclosure of information underpinning government decisions lies at the heart of FOI 
laws it is also trite that a government could not develop policies or operate effectively 
if it did not have ‘safe space’ for discussion, debate and disagreement as enshrined in 
the constitutional convention of cabinet responsibility, and in International law.80 
Politicians were naturally concerned that this ‘safe space’ would be threatened if FOI 
laws permitted premature or inappropriate disclosure of government information. 
Accordingly, legislators sought to assuage their concerns by introducing qualified 
exemptions regarding the formulation of government policy81 and the disclosure of 
material that would prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs 82  in both 
jurisdictions. In both jurisdictions requests for information regarding policy have been 
met with stiff resistance, with both governments making extensive claims that 
disclosure would substantially inhibit free and frank exchanges inside government.  
Indeed, the Independent Commission recommended amending the s35 
qualified exemption in a variety of ways such as: amending s35 to clarify that that 
s35(1)(a) can protect information which would disclose internal communications that 																																																								
78 Scottish Parliament Finance Committee. Official Report, 12 September 2012, Col 1522, 
79 Scottish Parliament, 6th Report, 2012 (Session 4): Stage 1 Report on the Freedom of Information 
(Amendment) (Scotland) Bill, SP Paper 201, available at: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_FinanceCommittee/Reports/fir-12-06w.pdf 
80 The Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (not yet ratified by the United 
Kingdom) recognises that the protection of deliberations within or between public authorities 
concerning the examination of a matter is a legitimate limitation to the right of access to information. 
The Convention however, states that this is not an absolute exception - it is only applicable when the 
protected interest may be harmed by its publication, unless there is an overriding public interest in 
disclosure. 
81 s35 FOIA; s 29 FOISA 
82 s36 FOIA; s 30 FOISA 
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relate to government policy and that s35(1)(b) can protect information relating to 
collective Cabinet decision making. The exemption should also make clear that when 
considering the public interest, the public interest in maintaining the exemption 
should not be weakened simply because the relevant policy decision had already been 
taken.83  The Cabinet Office indicated that the Government would  ‘not make any 
legal changes to FOI’84 in response to the Commission’s report, which was a welcome 
development as giving legislative effect to these proposals would steer the public 
interest test towards refusals to release information, potentially resulting in less 
information being disclosed under FOIA in future, particularly if uncertainty exists 
regarding when it is appropriate to disclose information ‘after a decision has been 
taken in the matter.’ If information was not disclosed on a timely basis then neither 
opposition parties, the media, nor the public would know whether a policy decision 
was made for objectively sound reasons as opposed to short-term political gain, that is, 
valuable opportunities for scrutiny, debate and refinement of thinking would be lost. It 
could lead to a return to the pre-FOI era in which all government information is 
secret until it chooses to disclose it and it will naturally not be minded to disclose it 
until it has lost its political ‘currency.’  
 
(d) Power of Ministerial veto 
Given that this ARTICLE 19 principle recommends narrow, exhaustive limitations, 
the inclusion of a ministerial power to issue certificates that override decisions in 
favour of disclosure on public interest grounds in both Acts is problematic. Under 
FOISA, the first minister can (following consultation with the Scottish Ministers) issue 
a certificate overriding a decision of the Commissioner where certain exemptions have 
been applied85 in relation to a decision notice served on the Scottish Administration. 
The First Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the information is ‘of 
exceptional sensitivity’ before a certificate can be applied. 86   Under FOIA an 
accountable person, that is, a Minister or the Attorney General can issue a certificate 
overriding a decision of the Commissioner/Tribunal that disclosure is in the public 
interest, and a decision notice to that effect has been served on a government 
department of public authority. The accountable person must have reasonable 
grounds for issuing the certificate and present it to the Commissioner and lay a copy 
before each House within 20 working days of the decision,87 and the veto power is 
intended to be used only in exceptional circumstances to pre-empt or overturn appeal 
rulings.88 On a positive note, no First Minister has ever sought to exercise the veto 
power.  At first glance, it appears that it has also been rarely used by Westminster 
MPs – only seven vetoes in a ten-year period, in comparison to 48 vetoes in the first 
four years of existence of the Australian FOI law. 89  However, each ministerial 
certificate represents an occasion on which the executive has overridden a judicial 
decision in contravention of the traditional doctrine of separation of powers 																																																								
83 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report (n 32) 25-29 
84 Cabinet Office (n 28) 
85 ss 29, 31(1), 32(1)(b), 34, 36(1) and 41(b) 
86 s52 (2). 
87 It is slightly different under FOISA (30 working days to issue certificate and then 10 working days to 
lay it before Scottish Parliament and serve copy of reasons on requester – see sections 52(2) and (3) of 
FOISA) 
88 Legal advice on hostilities in Iraq, Devolution Cabinet minutes, Devolution Cabinet minutes, NHS 
risk registers, Hostilities against Iraq 2003, Correspondence from Prince Charles and HS2 
89 R Hazell & B Worthy, ‘Assessing the performance of freedom of information,’ (2010) 27 
Government Information Quarterly 352–359  
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prompting the Lord Chief Justice in Evans 90  to describe the veto power as ‘a 
constitutional aberration.’91 Future use of the veto was uncertain following Lord 
Neuberger’s proclamation that ‘if Parliament intends to permit the executive to 
override a judicial decision merely because it disagrees with that decision, it must 
‘squarely confront what it is doing’ and make its intentions ‘crystal clear,’92 which in 
the absence of legislative reform, appeared to limit usage of the veto.  In response, the 
Independent Commission made a number of recommendations, which if 
implemented would lead to stronger but narrower veto powers. These 
recommendations include: amending FOIA ‘to put beyond doubt that it has the 
power to exercise a veto over the release of information under the Act,’ amending 
FOIA so that the executive veto is available to overturn a decision of the ICO only 
(removing potential vetoes in respect of Tribunal decisions) where the accountable 
person takes a different view of the public interest in disclosure, the effect of which 
would be that where a veto is exercised, appeal rights would fall away and a challenge 
to the exercise of the veto would be by way of judicial review to the High Court. The 
Independent Commission further recommended that the Westminster government 
consider whether the amended veto should make clear that the fact that the 
government could choose to appeal instead of issuing a veto will not be a relevant 
factor in determining the lawfulness of an exercise of the veto, and advised that until 
legislation is enacted, the government should only exercise the veto to overturn a 
decision of the ICO. Furthermore, the Independent Commission recommended that 
the Westminster government legislate to allow the veto to also be exercised where the 
ICO upholds a decision of a public authority (in effect a confirmatory veto agreeing 
with the ICO’s decision), so that the right of appeal would fall away and could only be 
challenged by way of judicial review.93 However, whilst the Government response to 
the Independent Commission’s report 94  indicated that it agreed with the 
Commission’s analysis that ‘Parliament intended the executive to be able to have the 
final say as to whether information should be released under the Act,’95 the Cabinet 
minister responsible for FOIA stated that the Government did not intend to legislate 
to amend the veto powers, preferring instead to modify it’s practices in deploying the 
veto: in future the government will ‘only deploy the veto after an Information 
Commissioner decision,’96 and further stated that if this approach proves effective it 
will not bring forward legislation to give effect to the other recommendations by the 
Independent Commission, but has retained the option of bolstering the veto power in 
law if necessary.97 By contrast, the Scottish Parliament did not review the ministerial 
veto power when debating whether to reclassify royal correspondence as ‘absolute’ or 
signal any intention to do so post-Evans  – a sign that the Scottish government has no 
intention of strengthening the veto power. 
The divergent approaches to the veto power are indicative of differing political 
cultures. The Scottish Government has, since its inception, been broadly supportive of 
a culture of openness and transparency, and accordingly, has not sought to use the 
veto power, whereas politicians in the Westminster Parliament that have experienced 
a long history of secrecy continue to struggle to foster a culture of openness and 																																																								
90 Evans, R (on the application of) v HM Attorney General & Anor [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin) 
91 Ibid para 2 
92 Ibid paras 56-58 
93 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report (n 32) 40 
94 Cabinet Office (n 28) 
95 Ibid 
96 Ibid 
97 Ibid 
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transparency, particularly in relation to information that might cause a minister 
embarrassment or expose weaknesses and deficiencies in government policies and 
decisions, hence their insistence on retaining the power to issue vetoes after ICO 
decisions have been made.  
Overall, neither Act is fully compliant with this principle. There is a pressing 
need to amend FOIA so that it contains a ‘substantial harm’ test rather than a mere 
‘prejudice’ test, so that it is more difficult for public authorities to refuse information 
requests.  Until then, FOIA will offer weaker information rights. Moreover, the 
Scottish government has complied with the ‘spirit’ of this principle in never exercising 
the veto power, but to ensure full compliance in the future it should amend FOISA to 
remove it.  By contrast, the Westminster Government’s stated intention to retain the 
veto power means that FOIA does not comply with this principle. The Scottish 
experience has confirmed that it is unnecessary, and it is to be hoped that Westminster 
politicians will choose to learn from this experience in the future. 
 
 
(5) Processes to facilitate access principle  
This principle contains measures concerning the processing of requests and an 
independent appeal process in recognition of the fact that a recalcitrant public 
authority could employ strategies such as making the application process difficult, 
delaying responding, and either having no appeal process to challenge non-disclosure 
decisions or having an excessively lengthy and expensive appeal process to avoid 
fulfilling information requests. 
 
(a) Measures concerning the fulfillment of requests 
Whilst both Acts include a duty to give written reasons for request refusals,98 oblige 
public authorities to assist requestors in refining their requests, 99  permit public 
authorities to refer requesters to published material in respect of repeat requests, and 
refuse vexatious requests,100 in compliance with this principle, there are marked 
differences in respect of the requirement to provide timely responses. FOISA complies 
with the recommendation that ‘the law should provide for strict time limits for the 
processing of requests on no more than one month’101 in that it obliges Scottish public 
authorities to respond within 20 working days.102  At first glance FOIA appears to 
impose a similar time limit of 20 days103 but if the request pertains to information that 																																																								
98 s 17(1) FOIA; s 16 (1) FOISA 
99 s 16 FOIA, s15 FOISA 
100  s 14 FOIA; s14 FOISA; The term vexatious is not defined in either Act, but in Dransfield v The 
Information Commissioner [2015] EWCA Civ 454, the Court of Appeal held that all of the relevant 
circumstances must be considered, including the motivation behind the request and the history between 
the requestor and the public authority, and the cost of compliance with the request, provided such 
considerations are balanced against the benefits of disclosure. The SIC recently issued guidelines along 
similar lines. SIC (2015) FOISA / EIRS Guidance Vexatious, repeated or manifestly unreasonable 
requests- A guide to the Scottish Information Commissioner’s approach. 
101 The 1999 version of the principles stated that ‘requests for information should be processed quickly, 
and within strict time limits.’ The revised wording introduces a stricter time limit, recommending that 
responses be provided within one month. 
102 s10; 30 if transferred to the Keeper of Records; At section 73 of FOISA 2002 a ‘working day’ is 
defined as any day other than a Saturday, Sunday, Christmas Day or a day which otherwise constitutes 
a bank holiday in Scotland. 
103 S 10(6) FOIA stipulates that a bank holiday falling in any part of the United Kingdom counts as a 
non-working-day for the purposes of FOIA. So, as January 2nd (or the nearest substitute day) is a bank 
holiday in Scotland, it is not a working day for the purposes of calculating the maximum timescale for 
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may be the subject of a qualified exemption then the response time is ‘such time as is 
reasonable in the circumstances’ to allow the public authority to consider the public 
interest balance.104 Thus, in many instances, public authorities send a ‘holding’ 
response within the 20-day period and take much longer to fulfill the request.  
The Independent Commission concluded that the slow response times by public 
authorities was unacceptable, and recommended that the Westminster government 
amend section 10(3) of FOIA to limit the period for which public authorities can 
extend the deadline for a response when considering the public interest to 20 days. 
Such an extension would only be available when the request involves information that 
is complex, high volume, or where consultation with a third party is necessary. If 
given legislative effect, this recommendation would improve the effectiveness of 
FOIA, 105  but the Government was silent on this issue in its response to the 
Independent Commission’s recommendations. 106  Thus, FOISA offers stronger 
information rights in facilitating timely responses, whereas requests made under FOIA 
may be delayed by a recalcitrant authority until the information has lost its 
newsworthiness or political currency; amounting to weaker information access rights 
that are arguably not fit for purpose. This will not improve until the time frame for 
responding under FOIA is reduced.  
 
(b) A three-tier appeal processes 
This ARTICLE 19 principle recommends a three tier appeal process comprising an 
internal review within the public body; appeal to an independent administrative body; 
and a ‘merits’ appeal to the courts. The aim is to provide a fast, cost-effective appeal 
process.   
FOISA contains a three-tier appeal process; the first tier comprises a right to ask a 
public body to conduct an internal review of its decision, which must be conducted 
and responded to within 20 working days of the request for review.107 The second tier 
permits a requester who remains dissatisfied after the mandatory internal review to 
ask the SIC to ‘make a decision’ which should be issued within four months, or a 
reasonable time period.’108  FOISA permits the SIC to attempt to informally effect a 
settlement before reaching decision, in an effort to provide a speedy, cost-effective 
solution.109 A right of appeal to a tribunal was considered but rejected during the 
legislative drafting process of FOISA on the basis that it would: ‘add an unnecessary 
layer of bureaucracy and possibly undermine the Commissioner’s powers’,110 that is, 
decisions would be more likely to be challenged if information requesters and public 
authorities knew they could be appealed to a tribunal, and public authorities could use 
it to delay releasing information that loses ‘currency’ over time. However, one 
consequence of the lack of Tribunal appeal stage is that appeals are more expensive in 																																																																																																																																																														
compliance with a request made under FOIA. For more information, see: J Baines, ‘What a difference 
a day makes,’ (15th June 2015), available at: http://informationrightsandwrongs.com 
104 s10; s 17(2) and (3). 
105 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report (n 32) 14 
106 Cabinet Office (n 28) 
107 s 21; (30 days if information held by Keeper and another authority has to carry out review) 
108 Appeals should be made to the SIC within six months – although the SIC can accept a late appeal 
where appropriate to do so.  s49(4)) If the SIC fails to make a decision within four months, or other 
reasonable period, then an information requester has the right to seek a judicial review by the Court of 
Session. The SIC must report annually to Scottish Parliament on the number of decisions which take 
longer than four months – s46(2).  
109 s49(4)). 
110 CFOI, (2009) ‘Freedom of Information in the Devolved Scotland, available at: 
http://www.centrefoi.org.uk/portal/images/foi_devolved_scotland_speech09.pdf 
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Scotland.  Also, although FOISA does contain a third level of appeal it may only be 
made ‘on a point of law’ against a decision by the SIC to the Inner House of the 
Court of Session, instead of a full ‘merits’ review by a court, as this principle 
recommends.111  
FOIA is not fully compliant with this principle either because it an excessive number 
of tiers of appeal. Unlike FOISA, it does not require internal review by a public 
authority, though in compliance with the code of practice, many public authorities do 
have an internal review procedure. Where one exists, it must be used before a 
requester can appeal to the ICO for a decision.112 However, a comparative weakness 
is that no time period for completion of internal reviews exists113 so requesters often 
experience frustrating delays.114  To address this, the Independent Commission has 
recommended that the government amend FOIA to impose a statutory time limit for 
internal reviews of 20 working days, which would bring it in line with the FOISA time 
limits.115  
At present, where no internal review exists or it has been exhausted, those 
refused access to information can complain to the ICO to make a determination.116 
Unlike FOISA, no provision exists under FOIA for the ICO to effect a settlement 
though complaints are routinely resolved informally by the ICO. Problematically, a 
backlog of complaints causes delay in ICO determinations (e.g. up to 23 months). An 
appeal, on merits as well as points of law, lies to the First-Tier (FTT) tribunal, then the 
Upper Tier Tribunal (UTT) can hear appeals from the FTT on a point of law if 
permission is granted by either the FTT, or if refused by the FTT, the UTT itself.  
Particularly complex and/or important matters may be transferred to the UTT 
(Administrative Appeals Chamber) under the Tribunal Rules, whilst an appeal on a 
point of law only, lies to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and, where necessary, 
to the Supreme Court. However, legal aid is not available for judicial proceedings, 
which has the potential to deter applicants. Indeed, FOIA has been criticized for 
employing ‘the most elaborate appeals processes of any in the world’117 which is 
complex, time-consuming and expensive to complete – it took ten years from an initial 
FOI request refusal to an eventual decision by the Supreme Court at a cost in excess 
of £270, 000.118 Moreover, if cases are referred back to the First-tier tribunal to be re-
decided, the process can be even longer. Thus, some cases take years to resolve, by 
which time the value of the requested information may have diminished, as was 
arguably the case in respect of letters written by the Prince of Wales to government 
ministers, which received a muted public reaction, perhaps due to the fact that many 
of the ministers he had written to were no longer in office, and the political issues were 
no longer live.  																																																								
111 A further right of appeal to the Supreme Court in London exists (s 29(2), Scotland Act 1998) for 
matters outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, such as cases concerned with 
human rights issues under the ECHR. The Supreme Court serves as the final court of appeal in such 
matters; to date just one FOISA case has been considered: South Lanarkshire Council v The Scottish 
Information Commissioner [2013] UKSC 55 
112 s 51 FOIA; s50 FOISA 
113 The ICO recommends that they are completed within 20 days   
114 House of Commons Justice Committee (n 18) 39-40 
115 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report (n 32) 15 
116 S50 (2) states that Commissioner can refuse to come to a decision if the applicant has not exhausted 
all remedies. Commissioner can refuse to investigate a case where there has been undue delay in 
appealing to him. 
117 CFOI, (2009). ‘Press Release: Iraq veto decision “extremely retrograde,”’ available at: 
http://www.cfoi.org.uk/foi240209pr.html 
118 R (Evans) v HM Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21 
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The Independent Commission acknowledged that FOIA contains an excessive 
number of layers of appeal and recommended that the Westminster government 
legislate to remove the right of appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal against decisions of 
the ICO on the basis that First-Tier Tribunal appeals too closely duplicate the full 
merits assessment conducted by the ICO. Removing this level of appeal would 
arguably strengthen the position of the ICO as the final arbiter of the substance of 
cases whilst also speeding up the appeal process and reducing the overall costs 
involved in pursuing an appeal.  Appeals would still lie to the Upper Tribunal, only on 
a point of law. 119  However, the Government’s response to the Independent 
Commission’s report was silent on the issue of reducing the tiers of appeal.120 It 
cannot be achieved without legislative reform, so FOIA will continue to have an 
excessive number of tiers of appeal for the foreseeable future.  
Overall, neither Act is fully compliant with this principle. To achieve full 
compliance, FOISA should be revised to include a Tribunal tier of appeal so that costs 
are reduced for those challenging non-disclosure decisions, and it should be revised to 
permit a full merits review by the Inner House of the Court of Session.  
Likewise,  the appeal process under FOIA should be amended to ensure that it is less 
complex and time consuming e.g. a requirement for public authorities to respond 
within 20 working days, mandatory internal review by a public authority within 20 
days, and the ICO to complete its reviews within a specified time period e.g. within 
four months, or a reasonable time period, as is the case under FOISA; of course this 
would have budgetary implications for the ICO and necessitate the provision of 
additional funding to the ICO’s office by the Westminster Government. Furthermore, 
the Westminster government should give legislative effect to the Independent 
Commission’s recommendation to remove the right of appeal to the First-Tier 
Tribunal, as so doing, would ensure FOIA is fit for purpose as it enters its second 
decade.  
(6) Reasonable costs principle 
In recognition of the financial and personnel burden of responding to requests this 
principle states that ‘the cost of gaining access to information held by public bodies 
should not prevent people from demanding information of public interest’ and that 
information should be provided ‘at no or low cost and limited to the actual cost of 
reproduction and delivery.’  
  FOIA permits a public authority to charge for: determining whether the 
information is held (or not), locating the information, retrieving it, and extracting it 
when calculating the cost of a request.121  If an excessive amount of time would be 
required to determine whether the information is held or not then there is no statutory 
requirement to provide it. If the projected cost is within the appropriate limit (£600 
for central government requests and £450 for all other UK public authorities charged 
at a flat rate of £25 per hour) then no fee is charged.  These cost limits have remained 
unchanged since 2005, when they were calculated by reference to the limit set by the 
Treasury for refusing to answer a parliamentary question on the basis of 
disproportionate cost (at eight times the average direct cost of civil servants’ time 
																																																								
119 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, Report (n 32) 43 
120 Cabinet Office (n 28) 
121 The Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 
(SI 2004/3244) (UK Fees Regulations) are used to calculate fees under the FOIA; Reg 4(3) 
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answering written parliamentary questions). 122  
  By contrast, FOISA123 permits a public body to charge for the direct and 
indirect costs incurred in ‘locating, retrieving and providing information.’124 However, 
a public body is not entitled to charge for any costs incurred in determining: whether 
it holds information,125 or whether or not the information should be disclosed. Where 
the projected costs do not exceed £100 then no fee is payable. Where the projected 
costs are beyond £100 but less than £600 then the fee, if sought from the applicant, 
should not exceed 10 percent of the difference between the projected costs and the 
£100 (free element). Thus, the maximum charge for a potential applicant is £50.126  
Moreover, the hourly rate for staff locating, retrieving or providing information in 
Scotland is lower - capped at a maximum of £15 per hour compared to a flat rate 
£25 per hour in the UK. Accordingly, an applicant in Scotland is entitled to 40 hours 
per request compared to 24 hours per request submitted to a central government 
department or 18 hours per request submitted to another public body in the UK. The 
method of calculating costs is, therefore, more ‘applicant friendly’ in Scotland for two 
reasons: firstly the lower hourly rate and secondly the approach taken by the SIC to 
fee calculation. For instance, in Decision 211/2012127 the SIC determined that rather 
than simply refusing a request on the basis that the cost would exceed £600, the 
public body should have liaised with the applicant to refine the request so that the 
bulk of the information requested could be provided. 128 Subsequently, in Decision 
055/2013 the SIC was not satisfied that a fee of £15 per hour should be charged, 
finding that the request could be processed by a staff member on a lower pay grade 
(£9.50 per hour).129 In challenging potentially inflated costs, the SIC has encouraged 
public bodies to adopt a pragmatic approach to the levying of fees for information 
requests. The ICO should heed this experience, since ‘A common complaint about 
the lowest transparency [Whitehall] departments is that they often lie to inflate these 
costs so they can refuse releases.’130 A more robust approach to costs would assist in 
ensuring greater efficacy. 
  Both Acts also contain provisions regarding ‘aggregate’ requests but employ 
different tests for aggregation. FOIA states that a public authority can aggregate the 
cost of complying with two or more requests.131 A ‘thematic’ test of ‘similarity, to any 																																																								
122 Hansard, House of Commons debate: Freedom of Information, The Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for Constitutional Affairs (Mr. Christopher Leslie), 9th June 2004, Col 97WH 
123 s12  
124 Freedom of Information (Fees for Required Disclosure) (Scotland) Regulations 2004, reg 3(1). 
125 Reg 3(2)(a). 
126 Freedom of Information (Fees for Required Disclosure) (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (Scottish Fees 
Regulations), Reg 5, a Scottish public body need not comply with a request for information if it 
estimates that the cost of compliance will exceed (£600). 
127 Decision 211/2012 Mr David Rule and the Scottish Ministers  
128 Scottish Ministers’ Code Of Practice On The Discharge Of Functions By Scottish Public Authorities 
Under The Freedom Of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 And The Environmental Information 
(Scotland) Regulations 2004, SG/2014/245, para 9.3.3 states: ‘When refusing a request on cost 
grounds, it is good practice for the authority’s response to provide clear advice on how the applicant 
could submit a new, narrower request within the cost limit.’  129	Scottish Decision 055/2013, Mr Rami Okasha and the Scottish Ministers. 
130 C Cook, ‘Is there trouble ahead for Freedom of Information?’ BBC News, (13 May 2015) available 
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32723791 
131  s12(4); Subject to the conditions at regulation 5 of the UK Fees Regulations: providing the requests 
come from the same individual within a 60 working day period and concern similar information.  The 
public body is not under any obligation to provide the information although, pursuant to section 13, it 
may still provide it and charge all of the costs noted above to calculate the limit, as well as the costs of 
reproducing and communicating the information to the applicant (paragraph 7 of the Regulations). 
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extent’ is employed. Thus, in UK Decision FS50503796, an applicant's requests for 
information from the Metropolitan Police Service regarding the number of 
surveillance operations undertaken, details relating to staff commitment and the 
number of persons under surveillance were held to be thematically linked even though 
not held as an aggregate record.  Evidently, thematic aggregation limits the volume of 
information an applicant can obtain through requests and undermines the 
effectiveness of the FOIA by acting as a costs deterrent to applicants. By contrast, the 
aggregation test in FOISA is whether separating the information to assess and 
calculate the interconnectedness would be ‘a wholly artificial exercise’. Thus, multiple 
requests contained in the same piece of correspondence from the same applicant are 
read as self-standing submissions, as opposed to constituent parts of the same request. 
For instance, in Scottish Decision 055/2013 the applicant submitted ten separate 
letters containing 35 separate information requests to Scottish Ministers requesting 
information regarding the awarding of a knighthood. The SIC ruled that each request 
constituted a different request for the purposes of FOISA and, as such, each of the 35 
requests assumed its own cost limit.132  If the request had been submitted to a UK 
body that used the  ‘thematic’ test of aggregation then it is likely the applicant would 
have been costs barred from receiving the information requested. However, under 
FOISA, if multiple requests are so interconnected that they should be treated as one 
for the purpose of responding then the request for information may be costs barred. 
For instance in Scottish Decision 134/2012, the Commissioner was satisfied that the 
applicant's six requests, for minutes of meetings held by the Scottish Criminal Cases 
Review Commission could be considered as one because: ‘identification and location 
of what is required to address each point cannot realistically be separated out into 
discrete tasks.’133 It would have been both illogical and impractical for a public body 
to separate out the request into six different tasks to be dealt with separately. Clearly 
the Scottish test is pragmatically applicant friendly. It strikes a better balance between 
facilitating related requests for information and protecting a public body from 
unrefined ‘fishing expeditions’ for information than the test used by FOIA.  
  Overall, the costs calculation measures in FOISA comply with the ARTICLE 
19 recommendation to a greater extent than FOIA. The Westminster Government 
and ICO should learn from the FOISA experience, otherwise recalcitrant public 
authorities and government departments will continue use fees to both deter and 
avoid fulfilling information request thereby weakening information access rights and 
continuing in non-compliance with this ARTICLE 19 principle.  
 
(7) Imperfect compliance 
Evidently, a decade after their implementation, neither Act fully complies with the 
UN endorsed principles synthetized by the NGO ARTICLE 19. FOISA offers 
stronger information access rights than FOIA, in terms of s5 power to designate public 
bodies (supported by the s7A requirement for Scottish Ministers to report to the 
Scottish Parliament every two years on the use/non-use of s5 powers during the 
reporting period), costs, fewer exemptions and lack of exercise of the power of 
ministerial veto, shorter, stricter time-frames for public authorities to respond, and 
fewer, faster appeal tiers. However, there is a need to review and remove the power of 
veto from both Acts, reduce the number of tiers of appeal in FOIA, and ensure 
adequate funding for Commissioners in both jurisdictions to ensure full compliance 
with the normative principles. The foregoing discussion confirmed that although both 																																																								
132 Scottish Decision 055/2013, Mr Rami Okasha and the Scottish Ministers. 
133 Scottish Decision 134/2012, Mr S and the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, para 14. 
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Acts entered into force on the same day and contain many identical provisions, 
divergences in scope and practices have emerged in the two jurisdictions. This begs 
the question, why? Are these differences attributable to the political culture of the 
respective Parliaments?  
 
 
C. Influence of political cultures? 
Three case studies are examined to determine the impact, if any, of the differing 
political cultures on information access rights in each jurisdiction.  
 
(a) Attitudes regarding the merits of information rights laws 
FOISA has, since its implementation, received broad continuous political support 
from some senior MSPs. For instance, a year after FOISA came into effect, Jim 
Wallace, who introduced the FOI Bill to the Scottish Parliament while Deputy First 
Minister, recalled fondly a personal political commitment to introduce freedom of 
information legislation:  ‘When I first stood for the Westminster Parliament… I 
committed myself to an FOI Bill’134 He had reasoned that ‘it wasn’t just a change of 
legislation, which was needed; it was a change of culture’.135 He expressed satisfaction 
that his election promise had become law and was broadly positive about its impact.  
A decade after its implementation he remained positive, noting that it had prompted a 
culture change of greater openness and transparency: 
 
The success of the legislation is not so much that individuals can demand 
information from public authorities, but that there are an increasing number 
of occasions when no demand is necessary – the material is readily 
available.136  
 
His disappointment that more had not been done to ensure that it kept pace with 
changes in public services was remedied later that year when the Scottish Parliament 
took steps to amend FOISA designation powers.  
The positive support for information rights expressed and repeatedly reaffirmed by 
Scottish politicians is in sharp contrast to the reactions of their Westminster 
counterparts. Indeed, an ever-present challenge to FOIA’s success is that posed by 
some Westminster politicians, who a decade on, still struggle to accept that freedom of 
information is a necessary part of the political and legal landscape. For instance, Tony 
Blair, whose Labour Government introduced FOIA famously decried his decision in 
his memoirs, stating: ‘Freedom of Information …You naive, foolish, irresponsible 
nincompoop…so utterly undermining of sensible government?’ 137  When he was 
Prime Minister, Mr David Cameron also displayed naked hostility towards FOIA, 
stating:  ‘I wish we’d spent more time in opposition thinking about how to declutter 
government. What I call the buggeration factor, of consulting… and FOI[A].’138 																																																								
134 J Wallace, (2006) Speech on Freedom of Information, Fourth Freedom of Information Conference at 
Holyrood, in G John, Relations that Unite and Divide: A Study of Freedom of Information Legislation 
and Transparency in Scotland, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews) (2009) 64 
135 (n132) 65 
136 Office of the Advocate General for Scotland and The Rt. Hon Lord Wallace of Tankerness QC 
(2014), ‘A speech to mark the tenth anniversary of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act’s 
implementation on 1st January 2005 available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ten-years-
of-foisa 
137 T Blair, A Journey (2010) 516 
138 J Russell, ‘24 hours with David Cameron,’ The Times, (28 March 2015) 
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These are not empty statements, as Roberts has observed that ‘the governing 
institutions in Westminster systems are particularly resilient, and capable of rejecting 
alien transplantations such as FOI laws, or of developing new routines designed to 
minimize the disruptive effect of these new laws.’139  Indeed, evidence exists which 
confirms that government departments have adapted their systems and processes to 
circumvent rather than facilitate information rights. For instance, the then Education 
Minister 140  deliberately used a personal email account instead of his official 
government email account to try to avoid capture by FOIA 141 prompting the ICO to 
rebuke the Minister and issue guidance on good practice.142 Moreover, the recent 
transfer of responsibility for FOIA to the Cabinet Office143 has raised concerns since 
this department is so notorious for its poor FOI performance and disclosure evading 
techniques that it has twice been subject to monitoring by the ICO,144 and is the 
subject of a website entitled: ‘Has The ICO Issued An Enforcement Notice Against 
the Cabinet Office Yet?.’145  Evidently, many Westminster politicians pay lip service 
to FOIA but remain implacably opposed to it.  It remains to be seen whether Theresa 
May’s Conservative Government will introduce a new more open culture. 
  
(b) Behaviour of politicians regarding FOI requests in respect of expenses 
Secondly, a FOISA request in respect of MSP expenses led to the revelation that the 
Scottish Conservative leader’s travel expenses were far in excess of any other MSP, 
and further that the spending was not all for essential parliamentary travel. The MSP 
resigned as leader of the Conservative group in Parliament, and the Scottish 
Parliament promoted openness and transparency through the creation of a searchable 
on-line database to fulfil future information requests regarding expense claims. 146 As 
the then SIC observed 
 
rather than resist further disclosure, the presiding Officer of the Scottish 
Parliament agreed to the extensive publication of all expense claims, which 
occasioned no further scandal.147   
 
A sharp contrast can be drawn between this and the response to a similar requests 
submitted in respect of Westminster politicians. The then Speaker of the House 																																																								
139 A Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (2006) 108 
140 (now Justice Minister) 
141 C Cook, ‘Labour calls for Gove emails probe,’ Financial Times, (20th September 2011)  
142 ICO, (2011) ‘Official information held in private email accounts,’ available at: 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1147/official_information_held_in_private_email_accounts.pdf; Retired civil 
servants confirmed that politically sensitive information is deliberately written on disposable post-it 
notes in some government departments to frustrate the operation of the act, B Wheeler, ‘Post-It notes 
and the end of written history,’ BBC News, (1st July 2015) available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10338038 
143 Cabinet Office ‘Written statement to Parliament - Freedom of information: new Commission,’ (17 
July 2015), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/freedom-of-information-new-
commission 
144 M Rosenbaum, ‘Cabinet Office delays over freedom of information,’ BBC News, (4th August 2015) 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33696753	
145 Available at: http://hastheicoissuedanenforcementnoticeagainstthecabinetofficeyet.com 
146 R Evans, ‘Fare disclosure: The Freedom of Information Act forced the downfall of Scottish Tory 
leader David McLetchie over his use of taxis, but what else has it revealed to the media in the past 
year?  The Guardian, (2 Jan 2006) available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2006/jan/02/mondaymediasection.politicsandthemedia 
147 K Dunion, Freedom of Information In Scotland In Practice (2011) 440 
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appealed against these FOI requests to the ICO,148 the Information Tribunal149 and, 
eventually, the High Court. 150 In the meantime, some MPs tried to amend FOIA 
through the introduction of a Private Members Bill, which passed through all 
legislative stages in the Commons, but failed when a sponsor could not be found in the 
Lords to take it through the upper house.151 The protracted (unsuccessful) legal battle 
and attempt to amend FOIA illustrate the intransigent attitude of some Westminster 
politicians whose refusal to capitulate in respect of FOI requests was encapsulated in 
the comment by an MP: ‘it's a brave general who surrenders.’152  
 
(c) Government responses to post-legislative reviews.	
If further evidence were needed of on-going political hostility towards FOIA, one 
need look no further than the differing response of the two Governments to reports 
calling for reform. For instance, the first SIC laid before the Scottish Parliament a 
special report in which he raised concerns that inertia regarding the exercise of 
designation powers would lead to FOISA becoming out-dated and ineffective. The 
Scottish Government resisted extending designation for a long time (9 years). It 
initially claimed it would be premature to designate before remedying deficiencies in 
the legislation. However, when it became apparent that the deficiencies were largely 
technical and unrelated to designation, it amended FOISA153 to oblige Ministers to 
report to Parliament on their use of the designation power every two years and give 
reasons for not using the power if it hasn’t done so in the two-year reporting period,154 
and in so doing, reaffirmed its commitment to having effective information access 
rights laws that are fit for purpose. 
By contrast, two reviews of FOIA have been conducted in the last four years. 
The first post-legislative review was conducted in 2012. The Justice Committee 
concluded that ‘The Freedom of Information Act has been a significant enhancement 
of our democracy,’155 and suggested a number of reforms to strengthen its operational 
effectiveness, including: a 20 day time limit (in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances) for public authorities to conduct internal reviews,156 the publication of 
data on the timeliness of their responses so that the ICO could monitor organisations 
with low rates of compliance,157 and, making s77 a hybrid offence so that potential 
prosecutions would not be time-barred.158 The Government did not legislate to give 
effect to these recommendations. A mere three years later, Mr Cameron’s 
Government established the Independent Commission to review FOIA whose remit 
included: extending safe space for policy development and strengthening the power of 
ministerial veto, despite the earlier review finding no clear evidence of problems with 																																																								
148 ICO 2007 FS50070469: 10;  
149 Information Tribunal EA/0006/0015 and 0016: 5–7; Information Tribunal EA/2007/0060 
150 [2008] EWHC 1084 
151 A Kelso, ‘Parliament on its Knees: MPs’ Expenses and the Crisis of Transparency at Westminster,’ 
(2009) 80 Pol. Q 3, 329-338.  
152 B Worthy & G Bourke (2011) ‘The Sword and the Shield: The use of FOI by Parliamentarians and 
the Impact of FOI on Parliament,’ 17, available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-
unit/research/foi/foi-and-parliament/sword-and-the-shield.pdf 153	The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (Designation of Persons as Scottish Public 
Authorities) Order 2013.	
154 SIC, (2013) Freedom of Information (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2013: Briefing Note, available at: 
http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?lID=6932&sID=377 
155 House of Commons Justice Committee, (n 18) 3 
156 Paras 103, 111, 112 
157 Para 109 
158 Para 121 
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either.159 The Independent Commission’s recommendations mirror those called for in 
the earlier review, but for a second time the Government indicated that it did not 
intend to give legislative effect to these reform proposals. The political inertia 
regarding legislative reforms belies claims by the Westminster Government to value 
FOIA.  A strong argument can be made given the remit and phrasing of questions in 
the most recent review that the true intention of the Westminster Government was to 
obtain evidence to justify restricting information access rights as opposed to seeking 
evidence on ways to strengthen it, but they underestimated the ability of civil society, 
the media and the public to quickly mobilise a strong campaign in support of FOIA. 
The Independent Commission’s consultation received in excess of 30,000 responses, 
including responses by 140 media groups160 and a petition with in excess of 170,000 
signatories161 calling on the Government to protect FOIA. Also, Senior Conservative 
politician, David Davis, MP, announced at an all-parliamentary briefing organised by 
the cross-party campaign to defend freedom of information that enough Tory rebels 
could be found to oppose any changes to the FOI Act, ‘Whatever they come up with, 
we can find an appropriate response in one house or another.’162 The refusal to 
legislate to strengthen FOIA confirms that the Westminster Government led by Mr 
Cameron was not minded to support and value FOIA, rather it opted to quietly back 
away from trying to restrict FOIA in the face of potentially overwhelming opposition, 
but retained the option to revisit issues such as exercise of the ministerial veto in 
future. Given the pressing issues flowing from the Brexit vote, it is unlikely to be a 
legislative priority for Mrs May’s Government. 
 
 
D. Conclusion 
Clearly, neither Act is currently fully compliant with the ARTICLE 19 principles of 
good practice. Changes are needed as the FOI laws enter their second decade to 
strengthen and consolidate the provisions in both Acts so that they are fully compliant 
with the UN endorsed principles. Implementation of the recommendations in this 
paper would ensure that.  However, it would be foolish to wait with bated breath for 
the Westminster Government to announce amendments to strengthen FOIA as 
despite the recent statement by the then Leader of the House of Commons, Chris 
Grayling, that FOIA ‘is a legitimate and important tool for those who want to 
understand why and how governments make decisions, and this government does not 
intend to change that,’163 a culture of secrecy is evidently ‘alive and kicking’ in 
Westminster, and dealing with the implications of the Breixt referendum (rather than 
FOI), is likely to be Theresa May’s priority. The Scottish Government has also faced 
challenges in adopting a more open culture. For instance, it was slow to designate new 
public authorities, and it continues to struggle with requests for information regarding 																																																								
159 Cabinet Office, Lord Bridge of Headley, Freedom of information: new Commission, (17 July 2015), 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/freedom-of-information-new-commission 
160 Independent Commission on Freedom of Information: call for evidence responses, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-commission-on-freedom-of-information-call-
for-evidence-responses  
161 R Falcon, ‘Freedom of Information: petition handed in,’ (19 Nov 2015), available at: 
https://home.38degrees.org.uk/2015/11/19/freedom-of-information-petition-handed-in/; In excess of 
20,000 signatures were added after the petition was submitted to the Independent Commission.	 
162 J Jackson, ‘Tory MPs will oppose watering down Freedom of Information Act,’ The Guardian, (30 
Nov 2015), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/nov/30/tory-mps-will-oppose-
watering-down-freedom-of-information-act 
163 Hansard, House of Commons debates, 29 October 2015, col. 522. 
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policy. Nevertheless, it has forged its own path in respect of Freedom Information – 
not feeling obligated to follow the Westminster attitudes, practices or any need to 
ensure legislative conformity. As a result, stronger information rights have emerged 
under FOISA than FOIA. The Deputy First Minister’s assertion that ‘Scotland has 
most robust Freedom of Information regime in the UK,’ was true, but it was the 
wrong benchmark to choose. A true test of commitment to FOI rights will be passed if 
the Scottish Government amends FOISA to ensure compliance with the UN endorsed 
principles.  
